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In this paper, we examine the determinants of illegal immigration in the United States from Mexico over
the period 1976-1995.  The main challenge we face in our empirical work is that we do not observe the number
of individuals that attempt to enter the United States illegally; we  observe, instead, the number of individuals
apprehended attempting to cross U.S.-Mexico border as a function of the number of illegal attempts to cross the
border and the level of border-enforcement effort exerted by the U.S. government.  We estimate a reduced-form
version of the apprehensions function using monthly data from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
on total apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border and the number of person hours the U.S. Border Patrol spends
policing the border,  and data on current and expected wages in the United States and Mexico.  We find that a
10% decrease in the Mexican real wage leads to a 7.5% to 8.8% increase in apprehensions at the border.  Under
plausible conditions this is a lower bound for the effect of the Mexican wage on attempted illegal immigration.
It is the purchasing power of U.S. wages in Mexico, more than the purchasing power of U.S. wages in the United
States, that matters for border apprehensions, suggesting that prospective migrants expect to remit a portion of
their earnings or eventually return to Mexico.  There is strong evidence that economic volatility in Mexico
contributes to illegal immigration.  Border apprehensions are higher in the month following a large devaluation
of the peso and higher when the change in the Mexican real wage is negative.  Finally, we find that each additional
hour the U.S. Border Patrol spends policing the border yields and additional 0.25 to 0.33 apprehensions.1
Immigration is once again a major political issue in the United States.  What makes the current debate
distinct from past debates is a focus on illegal migrants.  There is a popular perception that immigration cannot
be controlled unless the United States secures its borders against illegal entry.  This emphasis is increasingly
apparent in policy.  The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 raised sanctions on U.S.
employers that hire illegal aliens, and since the late 1980s the U.S. government has doubled the personnel it
assigns to enforce the U.S.-Mexico border.  A major source of concern about illegal immigration is economic
instability in Mexico.  The persistence of relatively high real wages in the United States creates pressure for
immigration, both legal and illegal, from Mexico.  The continuing volatility of the peso reinforces these pressures
by contributing to periodic steep declines in Mexican wages.
In this paper, we examine illegal immigration in the United States from Mexico.  We address two general
questions.  The first is, how responsive is illegal immigration to changes in U.S.-Mexico relative wages?  While
long-run U.S.-Mexico wage differences create obvious pressures for immigration from Mexico, short-run
movements in relative wages may also contribute to immigration by encouraging Mexican residents to ride out
Mexican economic downturns in the United States.  The second question is, what effect does border enforcement
have on illegal immigration?  Current U.S. policy is predicated on the idea that border enforcement reduces
attempts at illegal entry, in part by demonstrating that the cost of crossing the border is too high to be worthwhile.
We do not know in practice whether such a deterrent effect exists or how costly border enforcement is as a means
to control illegal entry.
The main challenge that we face in our empirical work is that we do not observe the number of
individuals who attempt to enter the United States illegally.  Instead, we observe the number of individuals the
U.S. government apprehends attempting to enter the United States illegally and the resources the U.S. government
devotes to enforcing national borders.  Our approach is to examine illegal immigration indirectly by identifying
the factors that determine apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border.  We develop a simple model of the individual
migration decision, in which the possibility of capture by foreign border guards is one component of the cost of        See Borjas (1994) for an excellent survey of the recent literature.
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migrating abroad.  From the model, we derive an aggregate expression for the number of individuals who attempt
to  cross the border as a function of expected wages in the source and destination country, the expected
probabilities of capture by border guards today and in the future, and expenses incurred in crossing the border.
We then posit the existence of an apprehensions function, which expresses the number of apprehensions at the
destination-country border as a function of the number of attempts to cross the border and the level of border
enforcement effort exerted by the destination-country government.
We  estimate the apprehensions function using monthly data from the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) on total apprehensions at U.S.-Mexico borders and the number of person hours the
U.S. Border Patrol spends policing the border, and data on current and expected U.S. and Mexican wages.  The
empirical results provide evidence on how relative wages and border enforcement affect illegal attempts to enter
the United States.  We show that under plausible set of  assumptions the effect of the U.S.-Mexico relative wage
on apprehensions is a lower bound of the effect of the relative wage on  attempts to cross the border.  If the
elasticity of apprehensions with respect to the U.S.-Mexico relative wage is large, then it is likely that the
corresponding elasticity for attempts at illegal entry is also large.  Similarly, by estimating the effect of border
enforcement on apprehensions we can determine the marginal cost of border enforcement as a policy to impede
illegal immigration.
Most literature on immigration addresses the general questions of how immigrants perform in the host
economy and what impact immigration has on the host economy’s labor market.   The literature on illegal
1
immigration is comparatively small.  Either (1985, 1986) develops a theory of legal and illegal immigration, in
which a small country chooses how intensively to enforce its borders given an exogenous immigrant supply




different set of issues.    Borjas, Freeman, and Lang (1991), using annual INS data, find that apprehensions by
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the U.S. Border Patrol are positively correlated with U.S. expenditure on border enforcement and the current U.S.
real wage.  Their interest, however, is primarily in determining the size and growth of the illegal Mexican-born
population in the United States.  Bean et al. (1990) and Espenshade (1990), using monthly INS data, find that
apprehensions declined following the implementation of IRCA.  There is no study that uses a dynamic
specification of illegal immigration or that considers the impact of expected future enforcement and expected
future relative wages on apprehensions.  Our contribution is to use an explicit theoretical model to derive an
apprehensions function and to use the estimated apprehensions function as a basis for examining the effect of
relative wages and enforcement on illegal attempts to enter the United States. 
The results of this paper have important implications for U.S. immigration policy and for U.S. policy
towards Mexico.  Both the $40 billion loan package the U.S. government organized for Mexico in 1995 and the
North American Free Trade Agreement were justified along the lines that they would reduce the flow of illegal
aliens into the United States.  To assess this argument we need to know how responsive illegal immigration is
to U.S.-Mexico relative wages.  The INS devotes a considerable proportion of its enforcement resources to
policing U.S.-Mexico border.  An alternative policy for reducing illegal immigration would be to more closely
monitor employers that tend to hire illegal aliens.  To assess the relative effectiveness of these policies, we need
to know how responsive illegal immigration is to different types of enforcement and the costs of different
enforcement strategies.
The paper is organized as follows.  In section I we present a model of illegal immigration.  In section II
we describe the data and discuss recent trends in border apprehensions, border enforcement, and U.S.-Mexico
relative wages.  In section III we present empirical results on the estimation of the apprehensions function.  And
in section IV we offer concluding remarks.        See Greenwood (1985) and Stark (1991) for a discussion of migration models.
3
        There is also the possibility of legal migration.  In the United States legal migration is a protracted process.  There is
4
nothing that precludes a Mexican resident who has applied for legal resident status in the United States from migrating
illegally while he awaits the decision of the INS (since there is no documentation on individuals who are apprehended at the
border).  For simplicity, we ignore legal migration.
4
I.  A Model of Illegal Immigration
Economists, beginning with Sjaastad (1962), view migration as an investment decision.    An individual
3
chooses to migrate when the expected discounted difference in the stream of income between the new and old
location are sufficient to cover moving costs.  Once the decision to migrate is taken, the prospective migrant
moves with determination?  In the context of illegal immigration, individuals must circumvent destination-country
authorities to successfully move abroad.  We extend the standard model of the migration decision to the case of
illegal immigration, in which we highlight the role of international border enforcement.
4
We analyze the migration decision of an individual agent in a discrete-time, infinite-horizon setting,
where D is the one-period discount rate.  At the beginning of each period, a prospective migrant decides whether
to stay at home or to try to migrate abroad.  The individual faces probability P of being apprehended by t
destination-country authorities and returned to his home country.  For purposes of illustration, let Mexico be the
home country and the United States be the destination country.  If the individual stays in Mexico, he earns the
expected Mexican wage at time t, w ; in the following period, he again has the option of staying in Mexico or mt
trying to migrate to the United States.  Define V  as the expected present discounted value of being in Mexico mt
at time t, which includes the option value of migrating in the future.
If the individual attempts to migrate to the United States, we assume that he incurs fixed cost C and t
forgoes the opportunity to earn a wage for the current period.  If the individual is apprehended by U.S. authorities
and deported to Mexico, he has the option of trying to migrate again in the next period, in which case his expected
value of being in Mexico is V .  If, on the other hand, the individual crosses the U.S.-Mexico border mt+1
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        The decision rule in (1.1) is valid if individuals are risk neutral.  It can be defined in terms of a Bellman equation that
5
is a variation of the optimal stopping problem (Dixit and Pindyck 1994), in which stopping means trying to migrate abroad:
 
5
is in the United States prefers to stay there forever; the option value of returning to Mexico is zero, and V , the ut
expected present discounted value of being in the United States at time t, equals the present discounted value of
U.S. wages.  We assume further that the individual does not know P with certainty, and instead bases his decision t
on the expected probability of capture, P .
e
t
Formally, the individual migration decision is described by the following rule:
which can be written as
The inequality in (1.2) has a straightforward interpretation:  the individual will attempt to migrate to the United
States if the difference between the value of being in the U.S. next period minus the value of being in Mexico next
period, discounted by D and the probability of avoiding apprehension, is large enough to compensate for the
foregone wage and cost C.  The prospective migrant takes into account the option value of delaying migration, t
which will be positive if he expects the probability of being apprehended to be lower in the future.
5
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        Individual attributes may also affect wage offers.  While heterogeneity likely influences the migration decision, the fact
6
that we have aggregate data on apprehensions makes it difficult to address this issue.
6
where I indexes the individual and G  is a vector of individual attributes, such as age and family status, that it
determine the migration cost, C . .  In (1.4) we make the simplifying assumption that all migrants have the same it
6
actual and expected probability of apprehension.
Adding together all individual indicator functions, we obtain an aggregate expression for M, the number t
of Mexican residents that attempt to migrate to the United States illegally at time t:
where N is the pool of prospective migrants.  Equation (1.5) expresses the number of individuals who attempts t
to cross the U.S.-Mexico border as a function of current and expected U.S. and Mexican wages and the expected
probabilities of being apprehended by U.S. authorities today and in the future.  Holding economic conditions in
the United States and Mexico constant, two factors create a flow of individuals attempting to cross the border
over time: increases in N, the pool of prospective migrants, and changes in G , the individual’s attributes. t it
Since P is the true probability of being apprehended at time t, it follows by definition that: t 
where A is the number of individuals apprehended attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally at time t
t and ’ is the distribution of individual attributes, from which G  is drawn.  Equation (1.6), which we term the t it
apprehensions function, is the basis for our empirical work.  A is increasing in the actual probability of t
apprehension, since a higher P implies that more individuals that attempt to cross the border are apprehended, tAt ’ P(Ht,Mt)(M(wmt,P e
t,Vut%1,Vmt%1,Nt,’t) (1.7)
At ’ F(wmt,wut,Ht,St) (1.8)
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but decreasing in the expected probability of apprehension, since a higher P  deters individuals from attempting
e
t
to cross the border.  We do not observe P directly, but we do observe H, the level of effort U.S. authorities t t
expend enforcing the U.S.-Mexico border.  We assume that P (and by implication P ) is an increasing function t t
e
of H.  It is also likely that P is a nonincreasing function of M:  as more individuals attempt to cross the border, t t t
the likelihood that any single individual is apprehended decreases.  Replacing P with the function P(H,M) we t t t
obtain,
From (1.7), we assume that we can obtain the following reduced-form expression for A, t
where S represents the information set available at time t that individuals use to generate predictions for future t
values of w , w , H, and other factors that influence the actual and expected probability of apprehension and mt ut t
current and expected future wages. 
II.  Data
The apprehensions and enforcement data we use to estimate the apprehensions function in equation (1.8)
are from unpublished INS records, which show for each month the number of individuals that the U.S. Border
Patrol (which the INS oversees) apprehends attempting to cross U.S.-Mexico border.  The data span the period
December 1976 to August 1995.  INS also maintains records on apprehensions and enforcement hours in the
interior United States.  To isolate the timing of factors that contribute to illegal immigration, we focus on        In 1994, apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border accounted for 66.0% of total apprehensions by the INS.  The
7
problem with studying apprehensions in the interior United States is that it is difficult to determine when the individual
caught first entered the country.
        Using dummy variables to control for seasonality imposes the assumption that the seasonal component in apprehensions
8
is the sum of a deterministic component and an i.i.d random variable.  No other variable in our data shows a seasonal pattern,
and the regressions we report show no evidence of serially correlated errors.  Hence, there is little motivation for allowing
the systematic seasonal component in apprehensions to be stochastic.
8
apprehensions and enforcement at the border.
7
Consistent with previous evidence, apprehensions show a strong seasonal pattern (Borjas, Freeman, and
Lang, 1991).  Figures 1a and 1b show monthly means for apprehensions and enforcement hours over the sample
period.  Apprehensions are relatively stable from January through August, of each year, and then decline steadily
from September to December.  One factor that contributes to seasonality in apprehensions is that many
individuals who attempt to cross the border are itinerant agricultural laborers.  The peak months for U.S.
agricultural employment are May through August.  Many Mexican farm laborers who work in U.S. agriculture
during the spring, Summer, and early fall return to Mexico for the winter harvest, during which time demand for
agricultural labor is relatively high in Mexico (Morrison and Zabin, 1993).  Hence, attempts to cross  the border
are concentrated during the first eight months of the year.  Border enforcement hours, in contrast, show no
seasonal pattern.
Since we are primarily interested in illegal immigration by nonagricultural workers, we correct for
seasonality in apprehensions by using monthly dummies as independent variables in the regression analysis.
8
There are no available data which allow us to assess agricultural labor demand in the United States or Mexico.
The temporal pattern of agricultural employment in the two countries suggests that there would continue to be
a flow of agricultural laborers across the border even if U.S. and Mexican wages were equalized.  Given that
itinerant agricultural workers are likely to be relatively insensitive to short-run (month-to-month) changes in
economic conditions, we lose little in controlling for the seasonal component in apprehensions.
Figures 2a and 2b show enforcement hours and (seasonally adjusted) apprehension over the sample        The INS enforcement budget increased by 83.9% in real terms between fiscal years 1985 and 1995, compared to a
9
24.6% real increase in nondefense-related government spending over the same period.  See Chiswick (1982) and Bean,
Vernez, and Keely (1989) for a discussion of immigration policy and border enforcement.
9
period.  There are large increases in apprehensions in 1983, 1987, and 1995 -- all years that correspond to a
devaluation of the peso and a recession in Mexico.  Enforcement hours are relatively constant until 1986, when
they begin to rise somewhat erratically.  Recent changes in U.S. immigration policy have greatly expanded the
enforcement budget of the INS.  IRCA mandated an increase in border enforcement, and the Bush and Clinton
administrations have further increased expenditure on enforcement.
9
Current and expected U.S. and Mexican wages are additional variables that enter the apprehensions
function in equation (1.8).  The wage and price data we use for Mexico are from the IMF International Financial
Statistics (IFS).  IFS is the only source of monthly wage data on Mexico for the entire sample period.  The IFS
wage series is a monthly index of the nominal average hourly wage of production labor in manufacturing.  There
may be some question whether manufacturing wages are the relevant local wage for prospective migrants in
Mexico.  One indication that they are is that educational levels among Mexican migrants in the United States are
similar to those for manufacturing workers in Mexico.  Borjas (1994) reports that in 1990 the average educational
attainment of Mexican-born men residing in the United States was 7.6 years; in 1990 average educational
attainment among men employed in Mexican manufacturing was 8.1 years.  Further, a large fraction of Mexican-
born workers in the United States are employed in manufacturing.  In 1980 45% of Mexican-born nonagricultural
workers in the United States were in manufacturing; in 1990 the figure was 37%.
The U.S. wage we require is the wage that a prospective migrant in Mexico expects to earn if he or she
successfully crosses the U.S.-Mexico border.  We construct an expected hourly wage based on the labor force
participation of Mexican-born individuals in the United States.  For the raw wages series, we use U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics data on monthly average hourly wages for production labor in seven nonagricultural U.S.
industries:  construction, manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance/insurance/real estate,
and services.  We calculate the expected U.S. wage as the weighted-average hourly wage in these industries,        The weights are calculated using employment data on Mexican-born individuals from the Public Use Microsample
10
of the 1980 and 1990 U.S. Census of Population.  We calculate the weight as the average industry share Mexican-born
employment in 1980 and 1990; hence, the weights are held constant over the sample period.
        In the estimation results described in section III we also used present discounted value relative wage series based on
11
monthly discount rates of .98, .9, and .5.  The choice of discount rate matters little for the results.
10
where we use the industry shares of nonagricultural Mexican-born workers as weights.   Table 1 defines the
10
variables and provides summary statistics.
Figure 3 shows the log of the U.S.-Mexico relative real wage over the sample period.  The relative real
wage is calculated as the weighted-average U.S. nominal wage, deflated by the U.S. CPI, divided by the Mexican
nominal manufacturing wage, deflated by the Mexican CPI.  The log scale in figures 3 and 4 is adjusted so that
the lowest value the wage variable takes in any period is zero.  Over the sample period there is a 61% difference
between the highest and lowest values of the relative real wage.  During just one eight-month period in 1982, the
relative real wage increased by 42%!  Most of the variation in the U.S.-Mexico relative real wage is the result of
variation in the Mexican real wage.  Figure 4 shows the log Mexican real wage and the log U.S. real wage.  Over
the sample period, the U.S. real wage declined steadily, showing a total drop of 18%, while the Mexican real wage
moved erratically, showing a total variation of 62%.
The model in section I specifies the migration decision as a function not just of current U.S. and Mexican
wages but also of the expected discounted stream of future earnings.  We construct estimates of the present
discounted value of the difference between U.S. and Mexican real wage streams using time-series forecasts.
Given that our real-wage measures are indices, we express the difference between the U.S. and Mexican real wage
for any time period as the log relative real wage (U.S. real wage/Mexican real wage).  We first estimate ARMA
models for the log relative real wage using rolling samples of eight years.  Then, for each month, we forecast the
log relative real wage far enough into the future that it converges to its long-run mean value.  We calculate the
present discounted value of the log relative wage for each month using a monthly discount rate of .995.   We use
11
the constructed series of present discounted values to measure the expected discounted difference between U.S.lnAt ’ " % ’
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and Mexican real wage streams.
The graphs in figure 5 show comovements between (seasonally adjusted) border apprehensions and two
key variables in our analysis, border enforcement hours and the U.S.-Mexico relative real wage.  For comparison,
we also show comovements between apprehensions and measures of other economic factors that may be relevant
to the migration decision, the U.S.-Mexico real exchange rate, and the U.S. unemployment rate.  All variables
are in logs.  Apprehensions show strong contemporaneous correlations with border enforcement, the U.S.-Mexico
relative real wage, and the U.S.-Mexico real exchange rate, and a weak contemporaneous correlation with the U.S.
unemployment rate. 
III.  Empirical Results 
III.A  The Apprehensions Function:  Specification and Estimation Issues
The specification of the apprehensions function we estimate is,
Since we do not observe illegal attempts to cross the U.S.-Mexico border, following equation (1.8), we substitute
into the apprehensions function a log-linear reduced-form expression that contains variables our model suggests
determine aggregate illegal attempts to enter the United States.  The explanatory variables we include are current
and lagged enforcement hours (lnH); current and lagged values of the U.S.-Mexico relative real wage (lnW ), t mt
a dummy variable for whether the peso was devalued in the previous month (PESO  ), lagged border t-1        We also include fiscal year dummy variables for all years after 1986 (when IRCA became law).
12
        In unreported results, we performed augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for nonstationarity on log apprehensions and log
13
enforcement hours.  We reject the null hypothesis of nonstationaity at the 10% level for both variables.
        An alternative measure of expected future enforcement would be an ARMA-based forecast of enforcement, similar
14
to our treatment of expected future relative wage streams.  The problem with this approach is that using a rolling sample to
estimate expected enforcement would severely reduce the sample size.
        During most of the sample period, Mexico had a crawling-peg exchange rate, so that, technically speaking, the peso
15
12
apprehensions (lnA), lagged apprehensions by the Border Patrol in the U.S. interior (lnA ); dummy variables for t t
I
the month (d ); and a time trend (t).   All variables are in log levels. s
12 13
We discuss each set of regressors in turn (see table 1).  Current enforcement hours represent the
contemporaneous effect of border enforcement on apprehensions; past enforcement hours capture the effect of
past enforcement behavior on future attempts at illegal entry.  There is no means through which prospective
migrants can obtain exact information about present and future border enforcement.  One indicator of future
enforcement is what the INS is observed to have done in the past.   The effect of past enforcement on current
14
apprehensions can be thought of as embodying the deterrent effect of enforcement on attempts to cross the border.
We discuss this and other interpretations in more detail below.
We use two measures of the expected U.S.-Mexico relative real wage: the actual U.S.-Mexico relative
real wage (lnRW), and the discounted sum of forecasted U.S.-Mexico relative real wages (PDV).  Specifications
with PDV as a regressor include an explicit forecast of expected relative wages.  We include both current and past
values of relative wages in the regression, since some individuals may respond to wage changes immediately
while others -- due to transit time in getting to the border -- may respond with a lag.  As an additional measure
of relative economic conditions, we include a dummy variable for whether there was a devaluation of the peso
in the preceding month.
15was being devalued daily.  To capture unanticipated movements in the peso (which primarily take the form of maxi-
devaluations), we define a devaluation as a greater than two standard deviation (F= 6%) increase in the peso-dollar exchange
rate.  There were 11 such episodes over the sample period.
        Apprehensions of illegal aliens by the U.S. Border Patrol in the U.S. interior are the result of road check points and
16
patrol sweeps in the border region (but not at the actual border).  Since these individuals are also deported to the Mexican
side of the border, they form a ready pool of prospective migrants.  (Given we do not know when these individuals first
crossed the border, interior apprehensions are not an appropriate sample for study on its own.)
13
Finally, we include lagged values of apprehensions as regressors.  Individuals who are apprehended by
the U.S. Border Patrol attempting to cross U.S.-Mexico border illegally are detained temporarily in the United
States and then returned to the Mexican side of the border.  Since these individuals are returned to the border,
instead of to their actual residence, they are likely to attempt to cross the border again in the near future, even if
economic conditions change.  Including lagged apprehensions as a regressor controls for dynamic adjustment in
attempts to cross the border that are due to U.S. deportation policy.  As a further control for the effect of
apprehensions on illegal attempts to cross the border, we include lagged values of Border Patrol apprehensions
in the interior United States as a regressor.
16
Several estimation issues merit further discussion.  Equation (3.1) can in principle be estimated by OLS.
OLS is useful as a first pass to check for serial correlation in the disturbance term and to search for the
appropriate lag structure on the regressors.  One source of concern is that the specification of the apprehensions
function in (3.1) is a reduced form of equation (1.8).  If the variables that we include in the reduced form are
imperfect measures of the true variables that determine attempts to cross the border, then our specification may
be subject to measurement error.  In this case OLS will produce inconsistent coefficients estimates.
A related estimation problem is that enforcement hours may be simultaneously determined with
apprehensions.  The INS is the agency responsible for enforcing the U.S.-Mexico border.  While the INS is
constrained by the enforcement budget the U.S. Congress sets in the previous fiscal year, it may have discretion
over deploying budgeted resources.  In particular, the INS may shift enforcement resources from the interior to
the border in response to observed changes in attempts to cross the border or to observed changes in the U.S. or        The variables we treat as exogenous are the peso devaluation dummy variable, monthly dummy variables, fiscal year
17
dummy variables, and the time trend.
        We show Durbin’s h statistic given that the regressions contain lagged values of the dependent variable.  Using
18
Breuch-Godfrey tests, we find no evidence of higher order serial correlation.
14
Mexican economies.  Border enforcement, then, may be a function of the same variables that determine attempts
to cross the border.  Additionally, shocks to enforcement hours may be correlated with unobserved shocks to
apprehensions.  Suppose, for instance, that the INS acquires new enforcement technology.  This could lead to a
simultaneous increase in enforcement hours to implement the technology.  This could lead to a simultaneous
increase in enforcement hours to implement the technology, and in apprehensions as the technology takes effect.
Correlation between enforcement hours and unobserved shocks to apprehensions would also produce inconsistent
OLS coefficient estimates.
To correct for the effects of measurement error and the endogeneity of enforcement hours, we estimate
equation (3.1) by GMM (Hamilton 1994).  We allow for the possibility that all continuous regressors are
correlated with the error term.   The instruments we use are lagged values of employment and average weekly
17
hours in U.S. nonagricultural industries, lagged values of Mexican imports, and the projected INS budget for the
current fiscal year.
III.B  Estimation Results
Table 2 shows OLS and GMM estimation results for equation (3.1).  GMM estimates are robust to
heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation in the errors.  Theory provides little guidance on the
appropriate number of lags to include on the regressors.  We show results for specifications that obtain the lowest
value of the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). In OLS regressions.  For both relative wage
variables, this specification has as regressors current enforcement hours and its firs lag, the current relative wage
and its first lag, and the first two lags of border and interior apprehensions.  In OLS regressions, Durbin's h
statistic shows no evidence of first-order serial correlation in the errors.    GMM results show a chi-square test
1815
of overidentifying restrictions on the instruments; in all cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.  GMM and OLS coefficient estimates are similar, although
GMM estimates are somewhat larger in absolute value for most variables.  This mainly reflects differences in
the short-run dynamics of the estimated system, since the long run elasticities in OLS and GMM regressions are
in most cases close in value.
There is a strong positive correlation between current border apprehensions and the first lag of either
border apprehensions or interior apprehensions.  This is consistent with the idea that apprehensions of illegal
migrants today contribute to attempts to cross the border illegally tomorrow by increasing the supply of
prospective migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border.  Alternatively, the results could also be due to serially correlated
shocks to apprehensions.  The effect, whatever its source, is not long lived.  Unreported results show that
additional lags of border and interior apprehensions are jointly statistically insignificant.
Current enforcement hours are, as expected, positively correlated with apprehensions, which suggests
that the marginal product of enforcement is positive.  The variable is highly statistically significant in all
regressions.  Lagged enforcement hours, in contrast, are negatively correlated with apprehensions.  This finding
is consistent with the existence of a deterrent effect: higher enforcement today signals higher enforcement
tomorrow, which, all else equal, reduces attempts to cross the border (and apprehensions at the border) tomorrow.
An alternative interpretation is that the effectiveness of enforcement declines over time.  An increase in
enforcement today may surprise migrants, causing apprehensions to increase, but over time migrants may change
their border-crossing strategies in a manner that diminishes the long-run effectiveness of the higher enforcement
level.  We also show the estimated long-run elasticity of border apprehensions with respect to border enforcement,
MlnA/MlnRW, which ranges in value from 0.92 to 0.96 in OLS regressions and from 0.79 to 1.03 in GMM
regressions.  Hence, there are near constant returns to scale in enforcement.
One question of interest for immigration policy is how costly border enforcement is as a means to impede
illegal immigration.  To address this issue, we calculate the marginal product of enforcement, MnA/MH, at mean        The elasticity of the present discounted value of the relative wage is difficult to interpret given an index number
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problem the relative wage we use is the difference in log wages, not the difference in wage levels.
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values for the explanatory variables.  Table 2 shows the results.  Based on OLS, an additional enforcement hour
yields and additional 0.28 to 0.32 additional apprehensions; based on GMM, an additional enforcement hour
yields 0.24 to 0.30 additional apprehensions.  These results suggest that for the U.S. Border Patrol to apprehend
an additional illegal immigrant at the border requires 3.1 to 4.2 additional person hours.  The main alternative
policy to border enforcement is monitoring employers that tend to hire illegal aliens.  To the extent that an
additional hour of employer monitoring yields substantially more than 0.3 additional apprehensions of illegal
aliens, our results suggest that the INS should substitute enforcement resources at the margin from border
enforcement to employer monitoring.
The results on both relative real wage variables show a similar pattern: apprehensions are positively
correlated with the current relative wage and negatively correlated with the lagged relative wage.  For ease of
interpretation, we present results in the form of coefficient estimates on the current relative wage and the change
in the relative wage.  The current relative wage, measured as either the actual level or the presented discounted
value of the forecasted level, is highly statistically significant in all the regressions; the change in the relative
wage is precisely estimated only in the regressions that use the present discounted value wage measure.
That border apprehensions are positively correlated with the change in the relative real wage is consistent
with the idea that an increase in relative earnings in the United States leads to an increase illegal attempts to cross
the border and an increase in apprehensions at the border.  Apprehensions are highly sensitive to changes in U.S.-
Mexico relative wages.  For the actual relative wage (lnRW), the long-run wage elasticity of apprehensions is 0.95
in the GMM regression and 1.07 in the OLS regression, implying that a 10% increase in the U.S. real wage
relative to the Mexican real wage gives rise to 9.5% to 10.7% increase in apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico
border.   We argue below that under plausible conditions the wage elasticity for apprehensions is a lower bound
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of the wage elasticity for illegal attempts to cross the border.17
That border apprehensions are positively correlated with the change in the relative real wage in consistent
with the idea that the direction of change in relative economic conditions in the United States and Mexico matters
for the illegal migration decision.  Further evidence of a link between relative economic volatility and illegal
immigration is that border apprehensions are positively correlated with the peso devaluation dummy variable;
in all regressions the variable is statistically significant.  A devaluation of the peso -- defined as a more than two
standard deviation increase in the peso-dollar exchange rate -- in the previous month is associated with a 6.5%
to 8.2% increase in border apprehensions.
An empirical link between economic volatility and migration was first established by Jerome (1926), but
there has been little work on this subject in recent years.  Changes in relative economic conditions provide
information about the relative time required to obtain employment in the two countries.  Mexico has experienced
repeated episodes involving a peso devaluation, a sharp drop in real output and employment, and a steep decline
in the real wage.  Although such wage declines may be temporary, they may still lead to an increase in attempts
to migrate to the United States.  Two types of individuals are likely to migrate in response to a temporary real
wage decline: Mexican residents who were planning to migrate in the future and who move their date of departure
ahead in time, and Mexican residents in insecure jobs who prefer to ride out the Mexican economic downturn in
the United States.
III.C  Interpreting the Results
While the results on apprehensions are interesting in their own right, the motivation for the empirical
exercise is what it can teach us about the factors that determine illegal attempts to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.
Consider the estimated long-run elasticity of apprehensions with respect to the relative real  wage, MlnA/MlnRW.
From the apprehensions function in (1.7), A=P*M where A is border apprehensions, P is the probability that t t t t t
the typical migrant is apprehended, and M is illegal attempts to cross the border, this elasticity can be written as, tMlnA
MlnRW














        This result requires that Rw have no effect on P. One case in which this condition may be violated is where the relative
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t t
wage influences the composition of individuals who attempt to cross the border.  Suppose, for instance, that some individuals
face a higher probability of apprehension due to limited border crossing experience.  These individuals would require a
higher relative wage than other migrants to attempt to cross the border.  An increase in the relative wage would shift the
composition of border crossers towards those with less experience, which, if experience matters, could cause the average
probability of apprehension to rise P would then be increasing in the relative real wage and it would not necessarily follow t
that MlnA/MlnRW $ MlnM/MlnRW. As long as such composition effects are small at the margin, we can ignore the implied
missing term in (3.3), MlnP/MlnRW.
18
The term of interest is MlnM/MlnRW, the elasticity of illegal attempts to cross the border with respect to the U.S.-
Mexico relative real wage.  As discussed in section I, it seems likely that MlnP/MlnM # 0, or that the probability
an individual will be apprehended decreases with total attempts to cross the border.  Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine conditions under which, for a given level of enforcement, more attempts to cross the border would
increase the likelihood that an individual migrant will be caught.  If MlnP/MlnM # 0, then MlnA/MlnRW is a lower
bound for MlnM/MlnRW.   In this case, our estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the U.S.-Mexico relative real
20
wage gives rise to at least 9.5% to 10.7% increase in attempted illegal immigration.
A similar argument applies to the interpretation of the enforcement elasticity of apprehensions.  From
equation (1.7), the estimated long-run elasticity of apprehensions with respect to enforcement, MlnA/MlnH, can
be decomposed as follows:
The term, MlnP/MlnH, is the elasticity of the apprehensions probability with respect to enforcement, which is the
direct effect of enforcement on apprehensions.  The term, MlnM/MlnH, is the elasticity of illegal attempts to cross
the border with respect to border enforcement, which can be thought of as the deterrent effect of border
enforcement on illegal immigration and which can be thought of as an indirect effect on apprehensions.
Enforcement impedes illegal immigration in two ways:  by capturing those who attempt to cross the border and19
by deterring those who would attempt to cross the border at a lower level of enforcement. From the above
discussion and empirical results, we expect that 0 # 1 + MlnP/MlnM # 1.  A deterrent effect would imply that
MlnM/MlnH # 0, which would make the second right-hand term in (3.3) negative and imply that MlnP/MlnH $
MlnA/MlnH.  To the extent that a deterrent effect exists, we underestimate the marginal product of enforcement
and overestimate the marginal costs of enforcement.  Hence, our estimate of MA/MH is a lower bound of the true
marginal product of enforcement.
III.D  Further Results and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we present an additional set of results to examine the robustness of our findings.  So far,
we have constrained U.S. and Mexican real wages to have a coefficient that is of opposite sign and the same in
absolute value.  We now relax this restriction.  An additional issue is whether we are using the correct measure
of the U.S. real wage.  Many Mexican-born individuals in the United States remit a portion of their earnings to
Mexico (Cornelius, 1992).  To the extent that  prospective migrants plan to support family members in Mexico,
they may evaluate U.S. earnings in terms of its purchasing power in Mexico, rather than in terms of its purchasing
power in the United States. As a way of pursuing this idea, we use two measures of the real U.S. wage, the
constant dollar U.S. wage (U.S. nominal wage/U.S. CPI) and the constant peso U.S. wage (U.S. nominal
wage*peso-dollar exchange rate/Mexico CPI).
Table 3 shows OLS and GMM results in which we replace the relative real wage with the Mexican real
wage (lnWMX), the constant dollar U.S. real wage (lnWUS1), and the constant peso U.S. real wage (lnWUS2).
Since the results on enforcement hours and lagged apprehensions are very similar to those in Table 2, we focus
on the results for the wage variables.  There is a strong negative correlation between border apprehensions and
both the level and the change in the Mexican real wage.  The Mexican wage in levels is statistically significant
in both regressions; the Mexican wage in changes is statistically significant in the OLS regression only.  The
long-run elasticity of apprehensions with respect to the Mexican wage is -0.75 in the GMM regression and -0.8820
in the OLS regression.  Consistent with the results in table 2, border apprehensions -- and, by implication, illegal
attempts to cross the border -- are highly sensitive to variation in the Mexican real wage.
Both the constant dollar U.S. wage and the constant peso U.S. wage (in levels) are positively correlated
with border apprehensions.  The estimates for the constant dollar U.S. wage, however, vary considerably between
the OLS and GMM regressions, and sensitivity analysis that we present in table 4 shows that coefficient estimates
on the variable are unstable and in general imprecisely estimated.  The results for the constant peso U.S. wage,
in contrast are stable across specifications.  Hence, there is strong evidence that prospective migrants care about
the purchasing power of U.S. wages in Mexico and only weak evidence that they care about the purchasing power
of U.S. wage in the same regression, we are in effect including the real exchange rate as a regressor.  This may
explain why the coefficient estimate on the peso dummy is smaller than that in table 2 and no longer statistically
significant.
The long-run elasticity of apprehensions with respect to the constant peso U.S. wage is less than half the
absolute value of the elasticity for the Mexican wage, suggesting that apprehensions are more sensitive to
Mexican wages than to U.S. wages.  This result is somewhat surprising given that empirical studies of migration
tend to find that pull factors, which in this case are U.S. wages, matter much more than push factors, which in
this case are Mexican wages (e.g., Shaw, 1986).  One possible explanation for this finding is that the relative
volatility of the Mexican economy gives Mexican wages greater weight in the illegal immigration decision.
It is natural to imagine that prospective migrants take economic conditions besides wages into account
in making the migration decision.  Unemployment rates in the United States and Mexico are obvious predictors
of the relative likelihood of finding a job in the two countries.  In table 4 we show results in which we include
unemployment rates and other measures of economic activity in the estimation.  For expositional ease, we present
results in terms of estimated long-run elasticities.  We use the overall U.S. unemployment rate, but we do not
include the Mexican unemployment rate.  One reason for excluding Mexican unemployment is practical; Mexican
unemployment data (and most other data on Mexican economic activity) are not available on a monthly basis until        The Mexican government defines the working population to be all persons over 12 years of age who worked at least
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one hour in exchange for payment during the previous two months.  Not surprisingly, Mexico’s unemployment rate is
relatively low and stable; over the period 1985-1994 -- during which Mexico experienced a severe recession -- the average
unemployment rate was 3.4% (with a range of 2.1%-5.7%) in Mexico compared to 6.4% (with a range of 5.0%-8.2%) in
the United States.  In unreported results we found no correlation between apprehensions and Mexican unemployment for
the period 1985 to 1995.
21
after 1985.  A second reason is that, given the definition of the labor force that the Mexican government uses,
the Mexican unemployment rate is not very informative.   The other measure of economic activity we include
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as a regressor is average weekly hours worked by U.S. nonagricultural laborers.
Most regression results are quite stable across specifications.  The long-run elasticities of enforcement
hours, the Mexican real wage, and the constant peso U.S. wage are similar to those we report in table 3.  As
indicated, estimates for the elasticity of the constant dollar U.S. wage vary regressors, there is a weak negative
correlation between apprehensions and the current U.S. unemployment rate (lnUNUS).  The estimated long-run
elasticity is -0.13 in the OLS regression and -0.18 in the GMM regression, but it is statistically insignificant in
both cases.  There is a weak positive correlation between apprehensions and average weekly hours worked by
U.S. nonagricultural laborers (lnHRUS).  While the estimated long-run elasticity for the variable is quite large,
it is statistically insignificant in both regressions.  Despite the lack of statistical significance, it is interesting that
average weekly hours worked have a larger estimated effect on apprehensions than does unemployment.  Given
the fluidity of the labor markets in which many illegal immigrants are employed, average weekly hours worked
may be a better indication of business cycle factors that affect demand for their labor.
In unreported results we experimented with additional regressors and with additional specifications of
the apprehensions function.  We found no statistically  (or economically) significant correlation between
apprehensions and other measures of economic activity in either the United States (industrial production,
nonagricultural employment, California and Texas unemployment rates), or Mexico (imports).  Moreover, the
inclusion of these variables had little impact on the results we report in Tables 2 to 4.  GMM results are robust
to the exclusion of individual variables from the set of instruments and both OLS and GMM results are robust22
to the inclusion of additional lags on border apprehensions.  We also examined whether there was a structural
break in the  regression equation following the implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in
1986 and whether the regression parameters were stable across the four seasons of the year.  In either case, we
fail to reject the null hypothesis that the regression parameters are stable over time.
IV.  Concluding Remarks
This paper uses data on apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol at U.S.-Mexico border to examine
illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States.  We find a strong negative correlation between the Mexican
real wage and border apprehensions and a positive correlation between U.S. real wages and border apprehensions.
The long-run elasticity of border apprehensions with respect to the Mexican real wage is -0.75 to -0.88, which
is consistent with the hypothesis that attempted illegal immigration is very sensitive to changes in Mexican wages.
It is the purchasing power of U.S. wages in Mexico, more than the purchasing power of U.S. wages in the United
States, that matters for border apprehensions.  This suggests that, consistent with case-study evidence,
prospective migrants expect to maintain links with Mexico, either through return migration or through supporting
family members who remain at home.   We also find that economic volatility in Mexico contributes to border
apprehensions.  Border apprehensions are higher in the month following a large devaluation of the peso, higher
when the change in the Mexican real wage is negative, and higher when average weekly hours worked in U.S.
nonagricultural industries are higher.  Finally, we find that each additional hour the U.S. Border Patrol spends
policing the U.S.-Mexico border yields an additional 0.25 to 0.33 apprehensions.  This estimate represents a
productivity benchmark against which other methods of controlling illegal immigration can be compared.
The importance of Mexican wages for border apprehensions suggests that factors that reduce the U.S.-
Mexico wage gap will also reduce illegal Mexican immigration.  These findings offer support for claims by the
U.S. government that policy initiatives such as NAFTA -- to the extent that they raise Mexican wages relative
to U.S. wages -- will reduce the northward flow of labor across the U.S.-Mexico border.  This is not as obvious23
an implication as it may at first seem, given that many studies of migration find that push factors, including
source country wages, matter relatively little for immigration.  The large impact of Mexican wages on border
apprehensions that we find suggests that it is a key factor in the illegal migration decision.  The relative variability
of the Mexican wage is an additional factor that contributes to immigration.  Occasional drops in the Mexican
wage, associated primarily with exchange rate crises, compound the effect of U.S.-Mexico wage differentials by
giving Mexican residents a strong incentive to seek safe haven in the United States during times of economic
turmoil.
An important topic for future research is whether economic volatility affects the composition, and not
just the level, of attempted illegal immigration.  Borjas (1992, 1994) finds that since 1970 there have been
changes in the labor force characteristics of Mexican-born residents in the United States.  Over this time period,
there has also been a sharp increase in the volatility of the Mexican economy.  To the extent that the individuals
who account for temporary upsurges in illegal Mexican immigration following periods of economic instability
differ systematically from those who compose the flow of illegal immigrants under stable economic conditions,
the recent increase in relative economic volatility in Mexico may account for some portion of the change in the
composition of Mexican immigration in the United states.  This issue has important implications to stabilize the
Mexican economy, such as the $40 billion package of loan guarantees extended in 1995, may represent an
indirect means of selecting type of individuals who attempt to become illegal immigrants.24
Data Appendix:  Border Apprehensions and Border Enforcement Hours
This appendix describes the border apprehensions and enforcement hours data that we use.  All data are
from unpublished files of the INS.  The INS distinguishes between two types of U.S. Border Patrol activities:
"linewatch" activities, which occur at international boundaries, and "non-linewatch" activities, which occur in the
interior of the United States.  We use monthly data on the number of individuals apprehended by U.S. Border
Patrol officers on linewatch duty and the number of person hours U.S. Border Patrol officers spend on linewatch
duty.  The importance of the linewatch data is that, since apprehensions occur at an international border, we know
the moment in time (the month) when the individuals apprehended attempt to enter the United States.  This makes
it possible to match apprehensions data to data on economic conditions in the United States and Mexico.  Non-
linewatch apprehensions occur at U.S. Border Patrol traffic checkpoints, raids on businesses, and patrols in the
U.S. interior (Bean et al. 1990).  We have no way of determining when individuals apprehended by Border Patrol
officers on non-linewatch duty first entered the country.  A further problem with this data is that a consistent
monthly series on non-linewatch enforcement hours only exists for fiscal years 1977 forward.  Over the period
1977-1996, linewatch apprehensions account for 61.2% of total apprehensions.
While most linewatch apprehensions and most linewatch Border Patrol activity occur at the U.S.-Mexico
border, some linewatch apprehensions and enforcement activity do occur at other locations in the United States,
most of which are international ports.  We have two data series from the INS:  linewatch apprehensions and
enforcement hours for the entire United States, which are available for fiscal years 1964 forward, and linewatch
apprehensions and enforcement hours for the U.S.-Mexico border only, which are available for fiscal years 1977
forward.  Given that the two series are very similar, we use the linewatch data for the entire United States, which
give us a much longer time series.  Table A.1 reports sample means and sample correlations for the two series
over the period for which they overlap, 1977 to 1996.
Table A.1:  INS Apprehensions Data, 1977-1996
Linewatch Apprehensions Mean  Std.  Error Correlation N
All Border Patrol Sectors  55,874   20,725  0.999 243   
Border Patrol Sectors on   55,424    20,649 243
U.S.-Mexico Border only
Linewatch Enforcement Hours
All Border Patrol Sectors 214,754  56,323   0.998    243
Border Patrol Sectors on  197,235    54,160 243
U.S.-Mexico Border only
Nearly all linewatch apprehensions occur at the U.S. border with Mexico.  Over the period 1977-1996,
an average of 99.2% of linewatch apprehensions occur at the U.S.-Mexico border.  Not surprisingly, the two
linewatch apprehensions series are nearly perfectly correlated, with a sample correlation of 0.999.  A slightly25
lower fraction of linewatch enforcement hours occur at the U.S. border with Mexico.  Over the period 1977-1996,
an average of 91.6% of linewatch enforcement hours occur at the U.S.-Mexico border.  The two linewatch
enforcement hour series are also nearly perfectly correlated, with a sample correlation of 0.994.  While it is
possible that the two linewatch data series deviate over the earlier period 1964-1976, for which we cannot make
a comparison, we believe this to be unlikely.  The Statistics Division of the INS reports that since the early 1950s
the vast majority of U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions have occurred at the U.S.-Mexico border.  To verify that
using linewatch data for the entire United States does not influence our results, in unreported regressions we
estimate the apprehensions function in (3.1) for both linewatch data series (all United States, U.S.-Mexico border
only) over the period that they overlap, 1977-1996.  We obtain nearly identical coefficient estimates for the two
series.  These coefficient estimates are also very similar to those we report in Tables 3-5.26
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Table 1:  Variable Definitions
       Mean
Variable Definition      (Std Dev)
lnA Apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol of individuals  10.83
attempting to cross U.S. borders illegally (dependent variable). (0.35)
lnA Apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol of illegal aliens 10.26
I
in the interior United States. (0.33)
lnH Person hours spent by the U.S. Border Patrol policing the  12.12  
U.S.-Mexico borders (does not include person hours spent (0.20)
policing the interior United States). 
lnRW U.S. weighted-average nominal hourly wage/U.S. CPI.  2.35  
(Mexico average nominal hourly manufacturing wage/Mexico CPI). (0.14)
PDV Present discounted value of forecast of lnRW (monthly  4.49   
discount rate = .995). (12.76)
lnWMX Mexico average nominal hourly manufacturing wage/Mexico CPI.  0.02 
(0.15)
lnWUS1 U.S. weighted-average nominal hourly wage/U.S. CPI.    2.37
(0.05)
lnWUS2 U.S. weighted-average nominal hourly wage*peso-dollar  -1.22
exchange rate/Mexico CPI. (0.20)
PESO Equals one if there was a greater than two standard deviation  0.05
increase (F = 6%) in the peso-dollar exchange rate during (0.22)
 the current month (11 total episodes).
lnUNUS U.S. unemployment rate.  1.91
(0.18)
lnHRUS Average weekly hours worked by U.S. nonagricultural laborers. 3.55
(0.02)
ln indicates the natural log.  Observations for all variables are monthly for the period December
1976 to August, 1995.29
Table 2:  Estimation Results for Border Apprehensions
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Method OLS GMM OLS GMM
Variable  (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)
                                                                                                                                                       
    
lnA  0.585  0.743  0.647  0.768 t-1
(6.987) (5.883) (7.808) (6.056)
lnA -0.080 -0.057 -0.046 0.007 t-2
(-1.049) (-0.455) (-0.590) (0.058)
lnA  0.114  0.299  0.064  0.233
I
t-1
(1.754) (2.916) (0.962) (2.141)
lnA -0.089 -0.218 -0.074 -0.184
I
t-2
(-1.439) (-2.189) (-1.174) (-1.853)
lnH 0.757 0.890 0.732 0.778 t
(4.560) (3.459) (4.319) (2.712)
lnH  -0.300  -0.567  -0.350  -0.601 t-1
(-1.739) (-2.284) (-2.005) (-2.281)
lnRW  0.528  0.299  --  -- t
(4.717) (3.213)
)lnRW 0.327 0.112 -- -- t
(1.840) (0.410)
PDV  --   --  0.005  0.003 t
(3.667) (2.122)
)PDV -- --  0.006 0.012 t
(2.284) (2.996)
PESO    0.075 0.081 0.082 0.065 t-1
 (2.340) (3.537) (2.423) (2.689)
Time       0.002    -0.002  0.007  0.0004
(0.492) (-0.522) (1.472) (0.070)
Long run Elasticities
MlnA/MlnH  0.923 1.030  0.958  0.785 
(4.810) (3.472) (3.903) (1.996)
MlnA/MlnH 1.068 0.953 0.013 0.011
(5.270) (3.656) (3.641) (2.099)30
Table 2: Continued
 (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)   
Marginal Product of Enforcement
MA/MH 0.282 0.300 0.316 0.235
(0.434) (0.268) (0.340) (0.236)
Durbin’s h statistic -0.743 -- -1.292 --
P  [dof] test of over- -- 32.47 -- 32.35
2
identifying restrictions [32] [35]
(P-value) (0.444) (0.597)
Adjusted R 0.932 0.919 0.929 0.918
2
Observations 223 219 223 219
Notes:
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Additional regressor (not shown) are monthly dummy variables and
fiscal year dummy variables for years after 1986 (When IRCA was implemented).  Durbin’s h statistic is the
t-value on the first lag of the residual in a regression of the residual on its first lag and the explanatory
variables. The value of MA/MH is calculated at mean values for the explanatory variables. Standard errors for
estimated long-run elasticities are calculated using the delta method.
GMM results are robust to heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation in the errors. The test of
overidentifying restrictions tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors
against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the instruments is correlated with the errors (with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of regressors). Instruments in
GMM estimation are the fourth to sixth lags of the regressors, the projected INS budget for the current fiscal
year, and the fourth to sixth lags of log employment and log average weekly hours in U.S. nonagricultural
industries, and the fourth to sixth lags of log Mexican imports. 31
Table 3:  Estimation Results for Alternative U.S. Wage Measures
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Method OLS GMM
Variable  (1)  (2)   
lnA  0.568  0.725 t-1
(6.774) (5.101)
lnA -0.080 -0.060 t-2
(-1.075) (-0.467)








lnH 0.752 1.034 t
(4.672) (2.986)
lnWMX  -0.451  -0.250 t
(-3.459) (-2.472)
)lnWMX  -0.374  -0.168 t
(-2.037) (-0.517)
lnWUS1 0.310 1.071 t-1
(0.466) (2.631)
)lnWUS1  -2.934  -1.300 t
(-1.518) (-0.461)
lnWUS2 0.183  0.107 t
(2.564) (1.957)
)lnWUS2   0.198 0.299 t
(1.436) (2.073)
PESO    0.032 0.043 t1
(0.907) (1.644)
Time 0.003  0.015   
(0.245) (2.208)32
Table 3:  Continued
 (1)  (2)   
Long-Run Elasticities




MlnA/MlnWUS1  0.605  3.190  
(0.460) (1.871)
MlnA/MlnWUS2  0.357  0.318  
(2.675) (2.244)
Marginal Product of Enforcement
MA/MH    0.251 0.329  
 (0.462) (0.187)
Durbin’s h statistic -1.053 --
P  [dof] test of over-    -- 27.34
2
identifying restrictions    [28] 
(P-value) (0.500)
Adjusted R    0.937  0.926
2
Observations      223  219
See Table 1 for variable definitions and notes to table 2 for a description of reported results.33
Table 4: Extended Estimation Results
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Method OLS GMM OLS GMM
Variable  (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)   
Long run Elasticities
MlnA/MlnH  0.831  1.038  0.857  1.478
(4.462) (3.720) (4.793) (2.444)
MlnA/MlnWMX -0.813 -0.509 -0.804 -0.588
(-3.292) (-1.668) (-3.266) (-1.346)
MlnA/MlnWUS1  -0.478  1.362  0.039  1.861
(-0.300) (0.808) (0.027) (0.603)
MlnA/MlnWUS2  0.443  0.466  0.382  0.410
(2.587) (1.640) (2.742) (1.775)
MlnA/MlnUNUS    -0.134    -0.177 -- --
(-0.861) (-0.749)
MlnA/MlnHRUS    --    --  2.423  8.132
(0.725) (1.548)
PESO  0.035 0.036  0.035  0.066 t-1
(0.967) (1.001) (1.006) (1.984) 
Durbin’s h statistic  -0.753  --  -1.047  --
P  [dof] test of over-    -- 29.17 -- 24.02
2
Identifying restrictions [26] [26]
(P-value) (0.575) (0.304)
Adjusted R  0.937  0.928  0.938  0.916
2
Observations    223  219  223  219
The explanatory variables for the regressions in Table 4 include those from the corresponding regressions in
Table 3, plus either the current value and first lag of the log U.S. unemployment rate (lnUNUS) or the current
value of first lag of log average weekly hours worked by U.S. nonagricultural laborers (lnHRUS). See Table 1
for variable definitions and notes to Table 2 for further description of reported results.